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ESSAY 
AT THE FRONTIER OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE: 
REFLECTIONS ON GOOGLE V. HOOD 
Gil Seinfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
N December 19, 2014, long-simmering tensions between Missis-
sippi Attorney General Jim Hood and the search engine giant 
Google boiled over into federal court when Google filed suit against the 
Attorney General to enjoin him from bringing civil or criminal charges 
against it for alleged violations of the Mississippi Consumer Protection 
Act.1 Hood had been investigating and threatening legal action against 
Google for over a year for its alleged failure to do enough to prevent its 
search engine, advertisements, and YouTube website from facilitating 
public access to illegal, dangerous, or copyright protected goods.2 The 
case has garnered a great deal of media attention,3 and with good reason. 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I’m grateful to Leah Litman and 
Brian Willen for reading and commenting on drafts of this Essay and to Sam Bagenstos and 
Debra Chopp for helpful conversations about the subject matter. Sommer Engels and Matt 
Evans provided stellar research assistance. 
1 Complaint at 32, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014). 
2 Jimmie Gates, Hood: AGs May Battle Web Giant Google, Clarion Ledger, June 6, 2013, 
available at 2013 WLNR 14011192; Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, Google Faces New Pres-




3 See, e.g., Dana Liebelson, Google Sues Mississippi Attorney General, Alleging Internet 
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It raises important questions about Internet service providers’ responsi-
bility for serving as a conduit to potentially dangerous or illegal goods, 
and it could have significant ramifications for the balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the states when it comes to regulating 
entities like Google. 
With the first round of procedural wrangling now in full swing, the 
case reads like something out of a Federal Courts syllabus. Thus, the 
parties have joined issue on the question whether the Younger doctrine 
requires the district court to abstain from adjudicating Google’s claims; 
whether there is an implied right of action available to Google under 
federal law to enjoin enforcement of Mississippi’s consumer protection 
laws; and, relatedly, whether the court has jurisdiction over Google’s 
claims for declaratory relief.4 There is even some discussion in the briefs 
of the obscure doctrine of complete preemption,5 though the doctrine is 
almost certainly irrelevant to the case, and its appearance in the Attorney 
General’s briefing is rather contrived. 
What is not contrived, however, is the Younger abstention issue, and 
it is on that aspect of the case that this Essay will focus. Google filed its 
federal court lawsuit approximately six weeks after Attorney General 
Hood served it with a subpoena demanding information pertaining to 
Google’s policies and practices relating to websites, YouTube videos, or 
advertisements that promote what the subpoena labels “Illegal Content” 
or “Dangerous Content.”6 Younger, of course, prohibits federal courts 
from interfering with a variety of ongoing state judicial proceedings,7 
and Hood has argued that the issuance of an administrative subpoena, 
google-internet-censorship_n_6354518.html; Eric Lipton & Conor Dougherty, Sued by 
Google, a State Attorney General Retreats, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 2014, at B2; Rolfe Winkler, 
Google Sues Mississippi Over Campaign to Restrict Searches, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-sues-mississippi-over-campaign-to-restrict-searches-
1419031558. 
4 See infra note 18. 
5 Attorney General Jim Hood’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint 
Based on Jurisdiction and Other Grounds at 20–21, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981 
(S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2015) [hereinafter AG Motion to Dismiss].  
6 Administrative Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tucem at 32–34, Google, Inc. v. Hood, 
No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2014). 
7 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (holding that federal courts must abstain 
from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings); infra notes 21–23 (citing cases extend-
ing the holding of Younger to non-criminal cases).  
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without more, gives rise to an “ongoing proceeding” sufficient to trigger 
the Younger bar.8 
This issue—whether Younger requires a federal court to abstain from 
hearing a case if state law enforcement officials have already issued a 
subpoena running against the federal court plaintiff, but no criminal or 
civil action is pending—has divided the lower federal courts.9 It also 
provides a useful vehicle for thinking about Younger more generally by 
calling attention to an important feature of the doctrine that is immanent 
in the Supreme Court’s post-Younger case law, but is not acknowledged 
explicitly. The cases signal, specifically, that federal courts must defer to 
state proceedings that are overseen by an impartial state actor—or, at 
least, one with a plausible claim to impartiality. Proceedings engineered 
and supervised exclusively by a prosecutor will not do. And since the is-
suance of a subpoena (at least the kind of subpoena at issue in this case) 
represents the unilateral act of prosecutorial authorities, it falls outside 
the ambit of the Younger doctrine. 
I. GOOGLE V. HOOD 
A. Factual Background 
In December of 2013, twenty-four state Attorneys General signed a 
letter to Google’s general counsel admonishing Google for using its 
products to “monetiz[e] dangerous and illegal conduct,” enable the shar-
ing and trafficking of content in violation of intellectual property law, 
“promot[e] . . . illegal and prescription-free drugs,” and “facilitat[e] . . . 
payments to and by purveyors of all of the aforementioned content 
through Google’s payment services.”10 The Attorneys General requested 
8 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 31–33. 
9 Compare, e.g., Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1181–82 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
the issuance of a subpoena by the state Attorney General is sufficient to require abstention 
under the Younger doctrine), and Cuomo v. Dreamland Amusements, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6321, 
2008 WL 4369270, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008) (same), and J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. 
Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL 2822208, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) (same), with, 
e.g., Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 518–19 (1st Cir. 2009) (declin-
ing to order abstention despite the issuance of subpoenas by the Office of Insurance Com-
missioners), and La. Debating and Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 
1491 (5th Cir. 1995) (similar), and Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 
1316, 1320, 1321 n.2 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (similar). 
10 Letter from State Attorneys General to Kent Walker, General Counsel, Google Inc. (Dec. 
10, 2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/correspondence-between-
state-attorneys-general-and-google/945/.  
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a meeting with Google to discuss these allegations and, more generally, 
“the abuse and presence of content [online] which represents a clear 
threat to public health and safety.”11 Over the ensuing weeks and 
months, Attorney General Hood would emerge as Google’s most dogged 
critic, repeatedly making public statements accusing Google of illegal 
conduct and threatening civil and criminal charges against it.12 
On October 21, 2014, Hood ratcheted up his investigation of Google 
by issuing a lengthy subpoena seeking documents and information per-
taining to Google’s efforts to police third-party content that users might 
access through Google’s search engine and its YouTube website.13 The 
parties negotiated a return date of January 5, 2015;14 but before that date 
arrived, Google shifted to offense. It filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Mississippi seeking a declaration 
that Google cannot be held liable under Mississippi law for content cre-
ated by third parties,15 as well as an injunction against enforcement of 
the Attorney General’s subpoena.16 Judge Wingate promptly stayed en-
forcement of the subpoena and scheduled a hearing for mid-February.17 
11 Id. 
12 Gold & Hamburger, supra note 2.  
13 See Administrative Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tucem, supra note 6. 
14 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 7. 
15 Google’s principal argument is that the Attorney General’s investigation runs headlong 
into the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which preempts state and local laws that as-
sign liability to Internet service providers for facilitating users’ access to online content pro-
duced by third parties. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Google Inc.’s Mo-
tion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 15–21, Google, Inc. v. 
Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter TRO Memo]; see also 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (providing that an Internet service provider may not be held liable 
as the “publisher or speaker” of third party content under state or local law). Google also 
contends that Hood’s investigation violates the First and Fourth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and is preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. TRO 
Memo, supra, at 22–26, 28–29, 31–33. 
16 See Complaint, supra note 1. Google’s strategic shift appears to have been motivated by its 
discovery that the Motion Picture Association of America was working behind the scenes to 
encourage and perhaps even orchestrate state investigations like those pursued by Hood. See 
Russell Brandom, Project Goliath: Inside Hollywood’s Secret War Against Google, Verge, 
Dec. 12, 2014, http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/12/7382287/project-goliath [hereinafter Pro-
ject Goliath]; Dana Liebelson, Emails Show Hollywood Worked with a State Attorney General 
to Push Its Anti-Piracy Agenda, Huffington Post, Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/12/18/movie-piracy_n_6348256.html; Nick Wingfield & Eric Lipton, Detractors of 
Google Take Fight to States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2014, at B1. 
17 Hayley Tsukayama, Judge Calls a Time-Out in Fight Between Google and Mississippi 
Attorney General, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
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B. The Procedural Battle 
The Attorney General has since moved to dismiss Google’s lawsuit, 
pressing a barrage of claims premised in one way or another on the no-
tion that, if Google wishes to fight the Attorney General’s subpoena, it 
must file a motion to quash in state court or wait for Hood to enlist the 
state courts’ help in enforcing the subpoena and challenge its validity 
then and there.18 One variation on this argument is premised on the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris.19 That case disables feder-
al courts from enjoining ongoing state court criminal proceedings,20 and 
it has been extended by the Supreme Court to encompass civil enforce-
ment actions,21 administrative proceedings that are “judicial in nature,”22 
and certain proceedings to protect state court judgments or orders.23 As 
Hood has yet to file an action against Google, however, there is no state 
proceeding pending against it at this time (at least not in the convention-
al sense), and so the case does not fit straightforwardly into any of the 
applications of the Younger doctrine that have previously been endorsed 
by the Supreme Court. 
Hood insists that issuance of the subpoena against Google neverthe-
less suffices to animate the Younger bar.24 The subpoena, he argues, is 
“part of an ongoing state law investigation” and is “judicial in nature.”25 
It is “an ‘integral part’ of a potential proceeding against [the Plaintiff],” 
and so the policies underlying Younger apply with full force.26 Google 
switch/wp/2014/12/23/judge-calls-a-time-out-in-fight-between-google-and-mississippi-
attorney-general. 
18 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 3. The Attorney General argues, in particular, 
that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Google’s claims, id. at 9–23, that 
Google failed to state a justiciable claim under the First Amendment, id. at 23–29, that 
Google’s claims are unripe, id. at 39–40, and (as discussed at length here) that Google’s 
claims are barred by the Younger doctrine, id. at 30–39. 
19 401 U.S. 37 (1977). 
20 401 U.S. at 53–54. 
21 See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 
592, 604 (1975). 
22 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 625–29 
(1986); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34 
(1982).  
23 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 
333–36 (1977).  
24 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 31–33. 
25 Id. at 31. 
26 Id. at 32 (quoting J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL 
2822208, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007)). 
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rejects this view. It argues that the subpoena is simply a “pre-litigation 
investigative tool” and not the sort of civil proceeding deemed by the 
Court to fall within the ambit of Younger.27 
II. AT THE FRONTIER OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE 
The question presented by Google v. Hood is easy enough to state: 
Does the issuance of an administrative subpoena by a state Attorney 
General prior to the filing of any enforcement action qualify as an “on-
going state proceeding” sufficient to trigger the Younger bar? The an-
swer, however, is not so simple. There is some temptation to say that the 
question is straightforwardly empirical—that, at any given time, we can 
simply observe whether a state proceeding is up and running, and an-
swer the Younger question from there. But of course this requires a 
working definition of the term “proceeding”—so that we know just what 
it is we are supposed to be observing—and the term is hardly self-
defining. We might say, for example, that a “proceeding” requires the 
filing of some kind of formal complaint or charge, in which case the 
mere issuance of an investigative subpoena, without more, would not 
qualify.28 But we might also reason, following Attorney General Hood,29 
that investigative work is a crucial part of any enforcement action, and 
that the issuance of a subpoena should therefore be taken as a sign that a 
“proceeding” is in fact underway. Both of these accounts are plausible, 
and so it seems unlikely that we’ll get meaningful traction on the ques-
tion that concerns us here by way of generalized reflection on what does 
and does not count as a “proceeding.” 
The Supreme Court’s post-Younger decisions, meanwhile, do not ad-
dress the question—at least not directly. There is a long line of cases 
stretching from Younger itself to the recent decision in Sprint Communi-
27 Consolidated Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and 
in Rebuttal to Defendant’s Response to Google’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction at 12–15, Google, Inc. v. Hood, No. 14-CV-981 (Jan. 22, 2015). 
Google also argued that Younger abstention is not warranted because its claim of preemption 
under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is “facially conclusive” and because the 
case falls within the exception to the Younger doctrine for circumstances in which a state 
prosecutor has acted in bad faith. Id. at 15–18. I will not address these arguments here. 
28 Some lower federal courts lean toward this position. See, e.g., Telco Commc’n, Inc. v. 
Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989); Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 637 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
29 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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cations v. Jacobs30 expounding on the contours of the abstention doc-
trine, but the decisions tend to focus on the question of what type of pro-
ceedings merit Younger deference.31 The question of when such a pro-
ceeding begins—of when we can say that it is “ongoing” for Younger 
purposes—has not garnered meaningful attention. 
If we examine the cases closely, however, and focus on the policy 
considerations motivating some of the line-drawing we see, we can iden-
tify principles that speak to the question in Google v. Hood. Collective-
ly, the cases suggest that only proceedings of a certain sort—those pre-
sided over by an impartial state actor—merit deference under the 
Younger doctrine. And if that’s right, then a proceeding is not “ongoing” 
for Younger purposes until such time as it has been turned over to an 
impartial state official or, at least, an impartial state actor is able to exer-
cise meaningful oversight authority. The administrative subpoena at is-
sue in the Google litigation was issued on the say-so of state prosecu-
tors—without any intervention by a state judge or other neutral officer—
and so abstention seems unwarranted. 
A. Investigative Activity and Available State Court Proceedings 
Before delving into Supreme Court decisions focused generally on the 
matter of Younger deference, it is worth examining lower federal court 
decisions addressed to the specific question that concerns us here: 
whether Younger kicks in upon the issuance of an administrative sub-
poena by state prosecutorial authorities. As noted above,32 the federal 
courts are divided on the issue. Some reason that the issuance of a sub-
30 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013).  
31 See id. (declining to extend Younger to cases involving pending civil actions between 
private parties); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 
350, 368 (1989) (refusing to extend Younger to cases involving pending state proceedings to 
review the legitimacy of state legislative or executive action); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 
481 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1987) (applying Younger to prevent federal interference with a state 
court judgment); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 
625–29 (1986) (administrative proceedings); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State 
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432–34 (1982) (same); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333–36 
(1977) (civil contempt proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977) 
(civil enforcement proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 603–05 (1975) (same); 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–62 (1974) (abstention not required when there is no 
prosecution pending against the federal plaintiff). 
32 See supra note 9. 
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poena “suffice[s] to initiate an ongoing state proceeding,”33 while others 
insist that investigation of this sort is “too preliminary . . . to constitute a 
‘proceeding’ triggering Younger.”34 Regardless of which side they take, 
however, the cases tend simply to assert that the issuance of a subpoena 
by prosecutors (or some other investigative move) either does or does 
not count as an ongoing proceeding. Sometimes they take the added step 
of reasoning by analogy to the array of Supreme Court decisions extend-
ing Younger outside the criminal realm. But what they do not do is ex-
plain why it might make sense (or not) to treat the issuance of a subpoe-
na as sufficient to trigger Younger. 
One opinion from the Southern District of New York, which con-
cludes that Younger does apply in these circumstances (and on which 
Attorney General Hood relies extensively),35 makes a partial attempt at 
explanation: 
Although the contested subpoenas are not part of a criminal proceed-
ing, they were issued by the Attorney General pursuant to an investi-
gation of Plaintiffs’ allegedly illegal activities, and the information 
sought may be used to initiate civil or criminal proceedings against 
Plaintiffs. . . . They are an integral part of a potential proceeding 
against Plaintiffs, and without such subpoenas, the Attorney General 
33 Cuomo v. Dreamland Amusements, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6321, 2008 WL 4369270, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008); see also Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that “[t]he issuance of [a] subpoena[] . . . is part of a state proceeding”); J. & W. 
Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 2007 WL 2822208, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2007) (finding that “Younger’s ‘ongoing proceeding’ requirement was clearly satisfied when 
a state agency . . . issued subpoenas, even though no formal charges had been filed” (internal 
quotations omitted)); Hip-Hop Summit Action Network v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm’n on 
Lobbying, No. 03 Civ. 5553, 2003 WL 22832569, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (same). 
There are also a handful of cases holding that the initiation of investigative work by a grand 
jury or the issuance of a search warrant suffice to trigger the Younger bar. See, e.g., Tex. 
Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2004); Kingston v. Utah Cnty., No. 
97-4000, 1998 WL 614462, at *4 (10th Cir. 1998); Craig v. Barney, 678 F. 2d 1200, 1201–
02 (4th Cir. 1982); Mirka United, Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 06 Civ. 14292, 2007 WL 4225487, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); Nick v. Abrams, 717 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
34 Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 519 (1st Cir. 2009); see also 
Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (find-
ing that “no state criminal or civil proceeding [was] pending” despite the fact that the state 
Attorney General had issued civil investigative demands to plaintiffs prior to their filing in 
federal court). Some lower federal courts insist that some formal enforcement action beyond 
mere investigation—such as the filing of a formal complaint or charge—is necessary for 
Younger to apply. See, e.g., ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 140 (3d Cir. 
2014); cases cited supra note 28. 
35 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 32–33. 
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seldom could amass the evidence necessary to commence fraud ac-
tions.36 
The difficulty with this analysis is that nearly all investigative activity 
by attorneys general could be characterized as “an integral part of a po-
tential proceeding;” and it is routinely the case that information sought 
by state officials in the course of an investigation could be used to initi-
ate a civil or criminal action. Yet it is clear that if a state prosecutor 
launches an investigation into possibly unlawful conduct, but restricts 
that investigation to things like conversations with the target, interviews 
with third parties, and informal requests for documents and information, 
Younger will not come into play. 
This is evident from the Supreme Court’s decision in the foundational 
case of Steffel v. Thompson.37 That case holds that Younger poses no ob-
stacle to a federal court plaintiff securing a declaration as to the constitu-
tionality of state law so long as there is no prosecution pending against 
the plaintiff in state court.38 In Steffel itself, the plaintiff was permitted to 
proceed with his federal court action for declaratory relief despite the 
fact that police officers had repeatedly investigated his allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct (distributing leaflets on a sidewalk outside a shopping cen-
ter) and, indeed, threatened him with arrest.39 In fact, plaintiffs filing 
Steffel-style actions for declaratory relief routinely call attention to in-
vestigative activity by state law enforcement officials in order to demon-
strate that their cases satisfy the constraints of the ripeness doctrine.40 
And courts are hardly in the habit of dismissing these cases on the 
ground that such investigation is “an integral part of a potential proceed-
ing” sufficient to trigger the Younger bar.41 
36 J. & W. Seligman & Co., 2007 WL 2822208, at *5 (internal quotations omitted). 
37 415 U.S. 452 (1974). 
38 Id. at 462. 
39 Id. at 455. A companion of Steffel had in fact been arrested and charged with violating 
state law for the same leafleting activity Steffel wished to engage in. Id. at 455–56. 
40 See, e.g., Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 605–06, 609–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Cooksey v. 
Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 231–32, 239–41 (4th Cir. 2013). 
41 And how could they be? If investigations of this sort sufficed to animate the Younger 
bar, Steffel would be reduced to a virtual dead letter. In many cases, it will be difficult to 
show ripeness without showing some evidence of prosecutorial interest (which is to say, 
without providing evidence of some “investigation”), and it would be impossible, then, to 
avoid dismissal under Younger. 
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court suggested that Younger applies not on-
ly to pending prosecutions, but to prosecutions that are “about-to-be-pending.” 504 U.S. 374, 
381–82 n.1 (1992). And some lower federal courts have called attention to this language. 
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Given Steffel, the argument for abstaining in a case like Google v. 
Hood seems weak. It is clear that routine investigative activity by state 
law enforcement officials will not cause the Younger bar to kick in, and 
it is difficult to see why application of the doctrine should be contingent 
on whether an investigation happens to entail use of the subpoena pow-
er. It is no answer to say that, with the issuance of a subpoena, the target 
of an investigation has access to a state court proceeding—initiated by a 
motion to quash—through which objections to the investigation might 
be ventilated.42 For it is equally true, at least in most cases, that the tar-
get of an investigation that does not include use of the subpoena power 
has access to a state court proceeding—an action for declaratory or in-
junctive relief—through which she might raise objections to the investi-
gation.43 
Here too, Steffel is telling. The Court in that case did not stop to in-
quire whether the federal plaintiff might have pressed his constitutional 
See, e.g., Kingston v. Utah Cnty., No. 97-4000, 1998 WL 614462, at *4 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Mirka United, Inc,. v. Cuomo, No. 06 Civ. 14292, 2007 WL 4225487, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
27, 2007). This is noteworthy because it suggests that one can have an “ongoing” proceeding 
prior to the formal initiation of an enforcement action, and that, in turn, suggests that investi-
gation alone might suffice to trigger the Younger bar. But the key passage from Morales is 
footnote dictum, and it finds no support in prior or subsequent decisions of the Supreme 
Court. Certainly the Court has never ordered abstention under the Younger doctrine in a case 
that did not involve an action formally pending before some state court or administrative 
body. Second, even if the imminence of a state court prosecution sufficed to trigger Younger, 
the question would remain whether Younger applies to cases in which state prosecutors have 
issued subpoenas but still no prosecution is imminent. 
42 Hood leans heavily on this point in his Motion to Dismiss, AG Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 5, at 5, 34–35, and lower federal court decisions ordering abstention in light of the issu-
ance of administrative subpoenas focus intently on the availability of state court proceedings 
to challenge the investigation. See, e.g., Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 
1981) (“The issuance of the subpoenas, under Arkansas law, is part of a state proceeding in 
which the plaintiffs to this action had an opportunity to present their claims. Challenges to 
such subpoenas can be made by a motion to quash in the state circuit courts . . . .”); Hip-Hop 
Summit Action Network v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm’n on Lobbying, No. 03 Civ. 5553, 2003 
WL 22832569, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (similar). The heavy emphasis on the availa-
bility of state court proceedings is a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Middlesex 
County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, which treats the issue as an essential 
part of the inquiry into whether Younger abstention is required. 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, however, admon-
ishes lower courts not to treat the conditions identified in the Middlesex case as dispositive. 
134 S. Ct. 584, 593 (2013).  
43 See, e.g., Miss. R. Civ. P. 57(a) (“Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions 
may declare rights, status, and other legal relations regardless of whether further relief is or 
could be claimed.”). 
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claims in some state court action for declaratory or injunctive relief. It 
was enough to refuse abstention that the federal court plaintiff was not 
party to an ongoing state court action in which those claims might have 
been raised.44 Nor, in the decades since Steffel was decided, have the 
lower federal courts endorsed the view that the availability of declarato-
ry or injunctive relief in some yet-to-be-initiated state court action suf-
fices to render abstention appropriate. The cases reflect the contrary 
view that it is one thing to say that a state court proceeding is available 
and another to say, as the Younger doctrine requires, that such a pro-
ceeding is ongoing. 
B. Investigative Proceedings That Are “Judicial in Nature” 
Despite all of this, federal courts are sometimes required to abstain in 
light of the pendency of state proceedings that include a significant in-
vestigative component. Thus, in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. 
Garden State Bar Association, the Court held that a federal court chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of New Jersey’s attorney disciplinary rules 
was barred because the plaintiff was the subject of a pending discipli-
nary hearing before the state Ethics Committee.45 And in Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, the Court ordered ab-
stention in light of the pendency of proceedings before the Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission.46 In each of these cases, the administrative proceed-
ing in question involved investigative work similar to the sort a prosecu-
tor might perform prior to initiating a criminal or civil enforcement ac-
tion;47 yet the Court resolved to lump these processes—part 
investigative, part adjudicative—along with criminal and civil enforce-
ment actions subject to the Younger bar, rather than depositing them in 
the Steffel category and exempting them from the abstention require-
ment. 
44 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. 
45 457 U.S. at 425, 437. 
46 477 U.S. 619, 621–22, 629 (1986). 
47 See Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 766 F.2d 932, 935 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (describing investigative work performed by the Civil Rights Commission), rev’d, 
477 U.S. 619 (1986); Garden State Bar Ass’n v. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 643 F.2d 
119, 123 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that the administrative body in question was “authorized to 
receive information relating to allegedly unethical conduct by a member of the bar” and to 
“inquire into the facts to decide whether a formal complaint should be filed”), rev’d, 457 
U.S. 423 (1982). 
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Middlesex and Dayton have come to stand for the proposition that a 
federal court must abstain not only in deference to state criminal and 
civil enforcement proceedings, but also in light of the pendency of state 
administrative proceedings that are “judicial in nature.”48 Yet neither 
case explains why, exactly, the administrative proceedings at issue were 
best regarded as “judicial,” rather than “administrative” or “investiga-
tive;”49 and, more important for present purposes, neither explains why 
“judicial in nature” is the barometer of whether Younger applies to an 
administrative proceeding. This is unfortunate because it makes it diffi-
cult to see exactly what drives the doctrinal move embodied in the two 
cases, and that, in turn, makes it more difficult to understand the policies 
underlying Younger more generally. As it turns out, moreover, under-
standing just why it matters that the proceedings in those two cases were 
“judicial in nature” can help us get traction on the problem in Google v. 
Hood. 
Younger famously explained federal courts’ duty to abstain from in-
terfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings by reference to con-
siderations of equity, comity, and federalism.50 Over time, the first of 
these considerations (equity) has receded to the background of the 
Court’s Younger jurisprudence,51 while the “more vital considera-
tion[s]”52 of comity and federalism have assumed center stage.53 In 
48 The phrase appears first in the Middlesex decision, wherein the Court took note of how 
the State of New Jersey classified the bar disciplinary proceedings at issue. 457 U.S. at 433. 
Dayton Christian Schools flags the point as doctrinally crucial. See 477 U.S. at 627 (“Be-
cause we found that the administrative proceedings in Middlesex were ‘judicial in nature’ 
from the outset, it was not essential . . . [for purposes of the Younger inquiry] that they had 
progressed to state-court review by the time we heard the federal injunction case.”(citation 
omitted)). 
49 In Middlesex, the Court emphasized that the New Jersey Supreme Court treats the rele-
vant administrative body “as the arm of the court” and “considers its bar disciplinary pro-
ceedings as ‘judicial in nature.’” 457 U.S. at 433–34. This suggests that the Court was will-
ing, at least to some extent, to outsource the question whether a proceeding is “judicial in 
nature” to the states. It seems entirely sensible to treat states’ views on this question as pro-
bative. But the question whether a proceeding is “judicial” within the meaning of the Young-
er doctrine must ultimately be one of federal law. And my point here is simply that Middle-
sex and Dayton provide little guidance on this score. 
50 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. 
51 See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431–32 (treating comity and federalism as “the policies 
underlying Younger”); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (acknowledging that 
“the traditional reluctance of courts of equity . . . to interfere with a criminal prosecution . . . 
is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil cases”). 
52 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
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fleshing out these principles of comity and federalism, the Court placed 
particular emphasis on the interests in avoiding duplicative litigation and 
in refraining from casting aspersions on state institutions’ willingness or 
capacity to deal fairly with litigants pressing federal constitutional 
claims. Thus, in Huffman v. Pursue, the majority emphasized that feder-
al court interference with a pending state civil enforcement action “re-
sults in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted ‘as 
reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitu-
tional principles.’”54 And, in Juidice v. Vail, the Court insisted that fed-
eral interference with state contempt proceedings “reflect[s] negatively 
upon the state court[s].”55 Lower federal courts now routinely flag these 
considerations as the primary forces motivating the Younger doctrine.56 
The key thing to observe at this point is that the Court has not extend-
ed this logic to ordinary investigative activities by state law enforcement 
officials. Again, we are back to Steffel. The Court in that case might 
have ordered abstention on the ground that when a litigant runs to feder-
al court in the hope of bringing some state investigation to a halt, it “re-
flects negatively” on state institutions—to wit, the officials pursuing the 
investigation (why presume that they will ignore constitutional con-
straints and bring a prohibited enforcement action?) and the state judici-
ary as well (why not look to state courts to test the permissibility of state 
laws or official action?).57 But it didn’t. Instead, the Court insisted that 
“considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality” 
53 The steady marginalization of the equity-based justification for the Younger rule is 
linked to the expansion of the doctrine to cover noncriminal state proceedings. See cases cit-
ed supra note 31. The venerable maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution 
could, of course, do no work in cases involving civil or administrative proceedings, and so it 
was necessary—if the results in the cases were to be persuasively defended—for the Court to 
lean heavily on the comity and federalism rationales. 
54 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)). 
55 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 (1977) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604); see also 
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431 (“Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes 
any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”). 
56 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 394–95 (4th Cir. 2005); Coruzzi v. 
New Jersey, 705 F.2d 688, 691 (3d Cir. 1983). 
57 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 437 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t can be 
argued that whenever a federal court rules on the constitutionality of a state statute, it is mak-
ing a decision that interferes with the operation of important state mechanisms, and perform-
ing a task that could equally be performed by a state court.”). To be clear, Justice Stevens 
was not endorsing the view that abstention is appropriate under such conditions. To the con-
trary, he insisted that, under such circumstances, the affront to principles of comity and fed-
eralism is “lesser.” Id. 
 
COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2015] At the Frontier of the Younger Doctrine 27 
when no prosecution is pending against the federal plaintiff.58 “When no 
state criminal proceeding is pending,” the Court explained, “federal in-
tervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption 
of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that 
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state 
court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.”59 
These arguments are unpersuasive. To begin with, the Court’s claim 
that the species of litigation authorized by its decision “does not result 
in . . . disruption of the state criminal justice system” is obviously false. 
Indeed, the whole point of the exercise (at least from the plaintiff’s per-
spective) is to disrupt the state’s criminal justice system. The disruption 
may or may not be warranted, but it is disruption either way.60 The same 
goes for the claim that the lawsuits authorized by Steffel do not reflect 
negatively on state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional principles. Of 
course they do. Indeed, the very existence of federal court jurisdiction in 
cases of this sort is an expression of uncertainty as to state courts’ will-
ingness to vindicate federal claims.61 The point is not that Steffel got the 
balance wrong; it’s just that the Court’s justifications are overstated and 
oversimplified. 
Despite the Justices’ reasoning, then, Steffel is best read not to support 
the conclusion that federal court challenges targeted at investigative ac-
tivity by state prosecutors cast no aspersions on state officials or institu-
tions, but that the casting of such aspersions is not always inconsistent 
with our federalism. Cases like Middlesex and Dayton Christian 
58 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. 
59 Id. 
60 See Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 
356 (2d ed. 1990) (“[Steffel] appears to contradict two of the . . . recognized bases of Young-
er deference—the desire to avoid interference with state substantive legislative policies and 
with state prosecutorial discretion. For whether or not a prosecution has been filed, federal 
relief tells the prosecutor ‘when and how’—and indeed if—he or she is to bring a prosecu-
tion.” (internal citation omitted)). 
61 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (“Congress . . . was concerned 
that state instrumentalities could not protect [federal] rights; it realized that state officers 
might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights . . . and it believed that these 
failings extended to the state courts.”); see also, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, at 486 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Hamilton justified the channeling of federal 
question cases to the federal courts on the ground that “the most discerning cannot foresee 
how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the 
jurisdiction of national causes . . . State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from 
year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the 
national laws”). 
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Schools, meanwhile, can help us to see why this is so. The Court’s em-
phasis in those cases on the question whether state administrative pro-
ceedings are “judicial in nature,” together with its refusal in Steffel to bar 
declaratory actions targeted at routine investigative activities by state 
law enforcement officials, suggests that application of the Younger doc-
trine is contingent on the formal participation of some impartial state ac-
tor in the enforcement and application of state law. Cases like Steffel just 
do not fit the bill; nor do administrative proceedings that lack what one 
federal court has labeled “trial-like trappings.”62 Though it is true, of 
course, that state prosecutors are officers of the court—duty-bound to 
uphold applicable state and federal laws—few would classify them as 
impartial actors in the mold of state judges or even in the mold of the of-
ficials who perform adjudicative functions for administrative bodies like 
those at issue in Middlesex and Dayton Christian Schools. The fact is, 
we expect that prosecutors will sometimes press charges and file com-
plaints (and certainly they will investigate) when the law says they 
should not; they operate in an institutional setting that conduces to that 
result. And so it is no great insult to state prosecutors to cast aspersions 
on the evenhandedness of their investigative efforts. 
This intuition fully explains the manner in which the cases sort. 
Younger, Huffman, Middlesex, and Dayton Christian Schools all involve 
state proceedings pending before a state body with a legitimate claim to 
impartiality.63 Steffel does not. The analysis here also suggests that it 
was essential to the holdings in Middlesex and Dayton Christian Schools 
that the plaintiffs did not file in federal court until after formal proceed-
ings before the state administrative bodies had begun.64 With the filing 
of formal charges in each of those cases, the work of the administrative 
62 Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining 
when the Middlesex/Dayton rule takes hold). 
63 The same holds for Juidice v. Vail and Pennzoil v. Texaco which, as noted earlier, see 
supra note 23 and accompanying text, extend the Younger doctrine to proceedings to enforce 
state court judgments or orders. In some cases, it will be difficult to determine whether hear-
ing officers presiding over administrative proceedings meet criteria of evenhandedness suffi-
cient to trigger Younger. These tribunals do not come labeled “neutral and evenhanded,” on 
the one hand, or “run by flunkies and hacks,” on the other. No doubt this is why some courts, 
like the Fourth Circuit in Telco Communications, inquire whether the proceedings in ques-
tion have “trial-like trappings.” 885 F.2d at 1228. 
64 Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 624; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 428–29; see also supra 
notes 28, 34 (identifying cases taking the position that the initiation of formal administrative 
proceedings, as opposed to more informal investigative ones, is essential to the application 
of the Middlesex/Dayton rule). 
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body shifted from strictly investigative pursuits to a hybrid of investiga-
tion and impartial adjudication. And with that shift, one of the central 
policy justifications underlying Younger—avoiding casting aspersions 
on impartial state decisionmakers—sprung to life.65 
Finally, this understanding of the Middlesex/Dayton rule finds support 
in decisions of the lower federal courts expounding on what it means for 
a state administrative proceeding to be “judicial in nature.” The Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Telco Communications v. Carbaugh is illustrative.66 
The court there explained that for an administrative proceeding to be 
“judicial in nature,” it must have “trial-like trappings.”67 And it focused 
on the questions whether the administrative body at issue initiated a 
formal hearing or requested a formal prosecution;68 whether meetings 
65 The analysis here might also help to explain—though it cannot justify—an interesting 
nuance in the lower court case law wrestling with the question of whether pre-filing investi-
gative activity suffices to trigger the Younger bar. If we focus only on cases involving the 
issuance of subpoenas by grand juries, or efforts to secure information by way of a search 
warrant, the decisions lean heavily toward the view that later-filed federal court challenges 
are barred by Younger. See supra note 33. If we focus, instead, on cases involving subpoenas 
issued by state law enforcement officials, but neither search warrants nor grand juries, the 
cases are fairly evenly split. See supra notes 33–34. There is language in the cases from the 
former category suggesting that they swing the way they do because there is at least the pati-
na of judicial oversight in the mix. See, e.g., Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 521 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“The grand jury is said to be ‘an arm of the court by which it is appointed.’ 
The district court impanels the grand jury after testing the qualifications of its members, ad-
ministers the jurors’ oath, and instructs them as to their duties as grand jurors. The grand jury 
can seek advice from the district court on any matter it is considering.” (citations omitted)). 
No such argument is available in the context of an ordinary administrative subpoena. Wheth-
er this pattern in the lower court case law is defensible would seem to depend on the extent 
of judicial oversight over the subpoena- and search-warrant-issuing processes. Only if the 
relevant state judicial officer can truly pass judgment on, and perhaps prevent, the relevant 
species of investigation does it make sense to say that federal judicial intervention casts as-
persions on an impartial state official. 
66 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989). 
67 Id. at 1228. 
68 As noted earlier, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, some courts treat the initia-
tion of formal proceedings as the crucial barometer of when the Younger bar kicks in. This 
metric, too, could be used to sort the major Supreme Court cases extending Younger outside 
the criminal realm. In many cases, of course, this inquiry and the one I focus on here will 
amount to much the same thing. That is, an impartial officer will become involved just as 
formal proceedings are initiated. I lean toward the “impartiality” formulation precisely be-
cause it seems to yield the sounder result in a case like Google v. Hood. The issuance of a 
subpoena would seem to qualify as a relatively formal investigative move. But it is difficult 
to see why Younger should attach to such proceedings simply by virtue of their formality. If 
it is permissible to “cast aspersions” on state prosecutorial authorities—and Steffel suggests 
that it is—why should it become impermissible to do so when the prosecutor has used the 
subpoena power? 
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held as part of the investigation involved sworn testimony and whether a 
record was maintained; whether the target of the investigation was per-
mitted to issue subpoenas and cross examine witnesses; and, crucially, 
whether an impartial hearing officer presided over the proceeding.69 
If all this is right, then Hood’s bid for abstention in the Google litiga-
tion ought to fail. The administrative subpoena under dispute in that case 
was issued at the direction of the Attorney General, without intervention 
or screening by a judicial officer or any other arguably neutral state ac-
tor. Attorney General Hood is exactly right to argue that Google’s feder-
al court action threatens to “interfere with . . . on-going state . . . pro-
ceedings” and “presum[es] that the state courts will not safeguard 
federal constitutional rights.”70 But he is wrong to think this poses any 
kind of problem from the perspective of the Younger doctrine. To the 
contrary, the cases seem to suggest that this is just what federal courts 
are for. 
69 Telco, 885 F.2d at 1228; see also, e.g., Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Sanchez-Ramos, 397 
F. Supp. 2d 327, 332 (D.P.R. 2005) (“The administrative proceedings that Younger is meant 
to protect must provide the parties involved with an opportunity to be heard and to present 
their version of the facts before a final determination is made; a neutral fact-finding pro-
cess.”). To be clear, fixating on the neutrality of the process cannot help to explain all of the 
features of the Younger doctrine flagged earlier. Most notably, it cannot support an account 
of why the law eschews any requirement that federal claimants exhaust state judicial reme-
dies nor, relatedly, can it help us to understand the Justices’ repeated insistence that even the 
pendency of state court proceedings will sometimes not be enough to motivate abstention 
under the Younger doctrine. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) 
(“Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the 
same subject matter.”); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 
350, 373 (1989) (“[T]here is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state 
judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts.”). Those features of the Younger doctrine 
are best explained by reference to the potency of the federal interest in providing a forum for 
the vindication of federal claims, see supra note 61, and the relative weakness of states’ in-
terest in litigation falling outside the categories of criminal proceedings, civil enforcement 
proceedings, and civil proceedings to enforce state court judgments or orders. 
70 AG Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 30, 35. 
 
